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Regulation, liberalisation
and interventionism
Some thoughts on the relation
between economic ideas and the crisis
The purpose of this article is to share some thoughts on the relation
between economic thought and the present crisis, and to do so in
two ways – from the perspective of the influence ideas have had
in creating the crisis and the impact this crisis may have on
dominant thought in the next decades.
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The creation of the crisis
There is ample reference on the economic
cycle describing multiple mechanisms through
which situations of strong and weak economic
activity of different length and intensity origi-
nate, propagate and endure time.
As occurs with avalanches and many other
natural and social phenomena, economic
imbalance tends to accumulate without
changing significantly the trend until it
becomes irresistible, and then this trend
abruptly changes. This is why economic cycles
trigger crises, understood as situations in
which after a relatively long period of fluid
activity it declines suddenly and dramatically.
Economic cycles trigger crises,
understood as situations in which
after a relatively long period of fluid
activity it declines suddenly and
dramatically.
Consequently, the gravity of an economic cri-
sis depends on the size of forces lying at its
origin and on the lack of flexibility of struc-
tures needing to adapt to it. My thesis is that
dominant economic ideas play a crucial role in
both factors.
For instance, it is well known that the world
of ideas that suffered the crisis in the 1930s
was dominated by liberalism and faith in the
market self-regulating capacity. The best
founded thesis on the cause of the depth and
length of that depression pointed towards the
US economic policy after the 1929 crash,
characterised by fiscal balance and laissez-faire
as the banking crisis was spreading all over.
This policy was based on the belief that
stakeholders having taken wrong decisions
(bankers who had invested carelessly and
savers who had placed their savings in wrong
institutions) needed to be punished and if
they were allowed to act freely, the market
would recover its balance in the quickest
and less costly way possible. In this respect,
it was also important that the public sector
adjusted its expenditure to revenue in order
not to divert resources from savings to pri-
vate investment. That is, the depth and
length of the crisis in the 1930s was under
the strong influence of the dominant paradigm
being based on the neo-classical dogma of
self-regulated market.
However, that crisis changed this paradigm
deeply, so from then on economy scholars had
to familiarise with two inconsistent models. In
the first – microeconomic – one, stakeholders
are rational, virtue is rewarded, irresponsibility
punished and the market tends to balance on
its own, and resource allocation is optimal. In
the second – macroeconomic – one, stake-
holders are still rational but virtue is not
always rewarded, the market tends to imbalance
and balance requires persistent, benevolent and
discerning action by a knowledgeable authority
that permanently adjusts public revenue and
expenditure and the monetary mass.
The 2008 crisis
To understand the present crisis, I think it is
important to distinguish between two different
phenomena that have come together in time:
the financial and the industrial crisis.
The financial crisis
Subprime mortgages as one of the main trig-
gers of the financial crisis have already been
massively referred to. There is no doubt that
the Western financial system took a set of risks
in recent years that seemed acceptable then
but now appear as being excessive, and there
is barely any doubt that it is this a sudden
change of mind what has triggered the crisis.
I will try to argue that this development has
been under strong influence of economic con-
sensus that was prevailing so far.
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Nothing is more frequent than hype and
depression in the financial system, and this
is due to the ease with which speculative bub-
bles form: once the price of a given asset rises
significantly for any reason, it goes on rising
because stakeholders expect it to do so, and
this expectation is self-fulfilling till it becomes
impossible to keep the trend, and then the
price plummets suddenly while stakeholders
try to get rid of the asset as quickly as possible.
This occurred with the tulip bulbs in 17th cen-
tury Holland, it just has happened with housing
in Spain and it occurred in between with many
durables, among which internet company
stock, and there is no reason to believe that
this will not go on with other assets as long as
humans have the opportunity of buying and
selling them in free markets.
Once the price of a given asset rises
significantly for any reason, it goes
on rising because stakeholders expect
it to do so, and this expectation is
self-fulfilling till it becomes
impossible to keep the trend, and
then the price plummets suddenly
while stakeholders try to get rid of
the asset as quickly as possible.
In the case we are dealing with, greed and
short-sightedness of financial business man-
agers has logically been largely blamed for it,
but in my opinion there has not been enough
emphasis on the responsibility of regulators.
Let us be plain: only the most extremist liberals
believe in the self-regulating capacity of finan-
cial markets, i.e. in their ability to prevent
greed and short-sightedness of finance man-
agers from driving their institutions – and
hence the whole economy – towards collapse.
The rest of economists believed and still
believe that financial markets need regulation,
which has to consist of two things: protecting
profitability of each financial institution and
controlling inflation. These are two very differ-
ent tasks but they share one point in common
that can be summarised in that famous and
fitting sentence said by one regulator: «With-
draw the alcohol when the party is getting
fun.»
However, it is quite clear that Western financial
regulators did not withdraw the alcohol when
they had to. To describe the situation of finan-
cial markets over a decade ago, the then main
regulator, Alan Greenspan, made the expres-
sion «irrational exuberance» famous. However,
from the point he said this till his retirement
as president of the Federal Reserve, the policy
of this body did not halt market liquidity. In
the meanwhile, in Spain and other real estate
markets suffering from acute inflation, less
knowledgeable observers were wondering
how such prices could be maintained over a
long period if they made it impossible for the
middle class to buy any housing.
Why did regulators not intervene and «with-
draw the alcohol» when the need to do so was
as clear to them as to the layman? More
specifically, why did financial regulators allow
excess liquidity to stay in the market after the
internet bubble burst?
The «deregulation» process made in the West
in the 1980s and 1990s has sometimes been
accused of being a cause of the lack of
response of finance authorities. According to
this view, regulators have been left without
any tool to act while the bubble was growing.
I think this argument is wrong as basic instru-
ments of monetary policy were in place.
It is true that accounting legislation allowed
banks to take some too risky assets from their
balance sheet, and it is also true that they were
able to securitise («package», as Anglo-Saxons
say) and sell them to any third party as rating
agencies assessed these assets in such an
unprofessional way as so-called single-line
insurance companies stood surety shortly after.
It seems hard to challenge that at least in the
US, banks, building societies, insurance com-
panies and rating agencies acted with unheard
carelessness, endangering their own assets
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and those of their customers (apart from the
fact that affected assets were eventually those
of the taxpayer). It is also true that the new
accounting legislation, specifically the mark-
to-market principle of asset assessment deepens
imbalance and forces to sell assets when their
price is falling, thus turning the decline of the
market more acute.
In the US, banks, building societies,
insurance companies and rating
agencies acted with unheard
carelessness, endangering their own
assets and those of their customers.
So in recent years, financial markets have been
provided with accounting rules as well as
agents and practices that eventually turned out
to be lethal. However, the Spanish regulator,
as seems commonly accepted, had no prob-
lems with asking for additional allocations to
protect the assets of Spanish banks. Why did
other regulators not do this? Why is it only
now that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) is acting against what has been
called «market stalls» here, financial institutions
managing pyramids, though it seems that
reports challenging them were piling in their
offices for years?
We will leave the answer to these questions
for later. Let us talk about the second mission
of a financial regulator.
Even if so-called «deregulation» had stopped
the regulator from acting upon the practice of
financial institutions, its second purpose would
still be fully valid: preventing inflation.
Inflation measured in terms of consumer price
or industrial price index has been moderate in
the last decade, basically thanks to the new
industrialised countries – particularly China
regarding goods and India regarding services –
that have provided products at a low price
and immobilised an enormous mass of West-
ern currency, especially US dollars. However,
inflation measured in terms of asset value –
stock, real estate, privatised infrastructure and
similar – has been astronomical.
From a formal point of view, the mission of the
regulator is to keep inflation measured in
terms of consumer price index under control.
However, common sense tells that inflation of
the asset value also needs to be controlled. It
is also known that when the monetary policy
sets an indicator to measure its effects, the mar-
ket immediately deactivates it. In my opinion,
the consumer price index has been the latest
manifestation of this principle.
From a monetarist perspective, we know that
any inflation has a monetary origin. Hence the
regulator had to know that behind asset price
explosion was a lax monetary policy.
The biggest bubble was the real estate one,
but the rest of assets have also followed this
explosive development. Looking at the prices
easiest to measure, i.e. stock, we will see that
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some too risky assets from their balance sheet
and sell them to any third party by securitising
them.
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the Eurostoxx index doubled in value between
early 2003 and late 2006, while the interven-
tion rate of the European Central Bank (ECB)
went from 3% to 2% and again up to 4%. In
the same period, the Dow Jones index kept its
level achieved after the 2003 rally (at a 25%
increase), starting later another one that led to
an additional 30% rise. In this period, the
intervention rate went down from 5% to 4%.
As a consequence, even if the regulator had
been unable to intervene in every financial
institution’s risk quality due to deregulation in
the 1980s and 1990s, it always could have
«withdrawn the alcohol» by simply applying a
restrictive monetary policy in order to halt the
inflation spiral in assets. It had the tools to do
so but it did not act. Why?
Political imposition is to be disregarded. It is
true that governments are barely inclined
to cool down the economy when it is time to
do so, but Western regulators are protected by
strong statutes. Incompetence is also to be
 disregarded, as regulators have been generally
selected from within people with a high intel-
lectual reputation.
The only explanation left is that regulators
knew that they had to take action but they
were not self-confident enough to do so. The
task of a regulator is ungrateful: when they
intervene to halt a spiral they are cooling
down the economy and frustrating a period
of which many people, if not all, seemingly
benefit, particularly very influential institutions
– financial institutions in general and their
 colleagues in particular. In this case, as in any
other, this consideration may have had its
stake. But I think we would be ignoring an
important item of the present crisis if we forgot
that economic regulation has been under
heavy fire over the last decades, and this must
also have played a role.
Until the crisis in the 1970s, consensus in
 managing the economic cycle was so-called
Keynesianism. According to this, the market
tends towards imbalance, and monetary and
taxation policy could – and thus has to – reduce
depression and keep a permanently high
employment level. In my opinion, Keynes’ con-
tribution is not this but the fact that under
exceptional circumstances, financial markets can
suffer a blockade as expectations are too pessimistic
and need to be unblocked by means of strong and
determined action: expansive monetary policy
and public deficit. In any case, Keynesian doc-
trine was usurped by technocrats and trade
unionists to discredit inflation control and fiscal
balance in a situation that had nothing to do
with the 1930s. The result was the inflation spiral of
the 1960s and, particularly in Europe, survival
of obsolete industrial structures under the pro-
tection of a public sector obsessed with controlling
unemployment. The process ended with the
perception that the West was on its way to a
social and economic disaster that threatened to
destroy the foundations not only of its welfare
but even of its global preeminence. This view
might seem exaggerated, but let us not forget
that the depression of the 1970s coincided with
defeat in Vietnam and the emergence of an
OPEC hostile to the West, at least in part, and of
Japan as a fearful industrial competitor.
Regulators knew that they had to take
action but they were not self-confident
enough to do so. Economic regulation
has been under heavy fire over the
last decades.
Ideological reaction came with an economic
doctrine that is as ideologically neutral per se
as Keynes’ ideas had been: monetarism, which
simply established that inflation always has a
monetary origin. However, its ideological
interpretation – among others by Milton
Friedman himself – went beyond that: the free
market is the best regulator of activity and
the mission of monetary policy has to be
exclusively the struggle against inflation (and
thus non-neutralisation of the economic cycle).
Unfortunately, as occurred with the previous
doctrine, this one has also been usurped by
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spurious interests – to be more precise, by
those advocating tax reduction for the highest
incomes and weakening regulation of specula-
tive activities. Usurpation took place out of the
«invisible hand» that took the market (once again)
to the position of the best possible mechanism to
allocate resources at both microeconomic and
macroeconomic level. This sanctification of
the market has been to the detriment of regu-
lation: let us remember the success of Ronald
Reagan’s sentence: «The state is the problem,
not the solution». Well, the state is, above all,
regulation.
Where does legitimate defence of an economic
management model – either Keynesian or
 liberal – end and where starts its illegitimate
distortion? In my opinion, one of the corner-
stones is tax deficit: the predatory character
of such usurpation becomes apparent in that
both cases coincide in ransacking collective
property. Interested exploitation of Keynesianism
had led to advocate tax deficit by expanding
public expenditure, arguing that it would later
lead to increase activity and thus tax revenue.
Starting with Reagan, exploitation of mone-
tarism has led to advocate tax deficit with the
same argument as long as there is tax reduction
at its origin.
In our case, the first symptoms of how bad
management was did not take long to appear
in the shape of general tax deficit in the West
that went hand in hand with tax reductions
(not in the case of Spain) and fraudulent practice
(of which Enron was the first case and Bernard
Madoff one of the last), taking place in a
 setting of discredited regulation.
Finally, due to the lack of formal alerts – infla-
tion or exchange rate pressure – regulators
were not feeling legitimated to take action
because of discredit of interventionism and
because dominant consensus stated that the
market would finally be self-regulating.
According to this analysis, the root of inactivity
of the regulator and thus of the gravity
of the crisis has not been instrumental but
ideological.
Western governments are trusted to
save the economy from disaster by
intervening in the financial system.
Public deficit does not seem to be
penalised in the European Union
anymore. To entrepreneurs, the state
is not the problem but the solution
now.
The party finished as all bubbles do: bad. But
the fact that the regulator allowed it to last so
long drove correction to an extreme that
placed financial markets in a blockade as the
one Keynes described in the 1930s: mistrust of
financial institutions, pessimism about eco-
nomic development and asset prices, «liquidity
trap» and credit crunch for companies. The
result is a decline in economic activity and
pessimism as it had not been seen since the
1930s.
From an ideological point of view, the crisis
will most likely do away with the reputation of
liberalism in general and «neoliberalism» in
particular. Western governments are now
nationalising financial institutions and are
trusted to save the economy from disaster by
intervening in the financial system, entering the
shareholder structure of financial institutions
and spearheading their credit policy. Public
deficit does not seem to be penalised in the
European Union anymore – all this amidst
applause of business leaders. One of them,
based in Spain, summarised this change of
attitude talking of the need of a «market
moratorium». To entrepreneurs, the state is not
the problem but the solution now.
The institutional crisis
Let us turn to the industrial crisis that broke
out at the same time as the financial one.
The extraordinary industrialisation process in
the East developed according to a system
based on low saving and trade deficit in the
185paradigmes /  Issue no. 2 / June 2009
A_180-188_Puig_1.qxp:núm.2  23/6/09  13:33  Página 185
West compensated by high saving and speciali -
sation on exports in the East. Specifically
China has been the financial hinge of it.
Meanwhile, the lax monetary policy and the
subsequent inflation spiral of asset prices led
some Western countries to specialise in
 building, a branch protected from international
competition and turned an exceptionally
lucrative activity. This specialisation was
 particularly strong in Spain.
The lax monetary policy and the
subsequent inflation spiral of asset
prices led some Western countries
to specialise in building, a branch
protected from international
competition and turned an
exceptionally lucrative activity.
The burst of the financial bubble set an end to
Spanish deficit financing and caused an abrupt
fall in expectations on housing prices. This in
turn caused demand to disappear and a build-
ing standstill. The price decline will become
even stronger when delinquency of transactions
done with speculative purposes and possible
return of migrants provide the market with
additional stock in vacant housing.
Even in countries not specialising in building,
readjustment of the leveraging capacity of
owners and pessimism, both as a conse-
quence of the financial crisis, have led demand
of durables to plummet, which affects produc-
tion in both the West and especially the East.
To summarise, the industrial crisis has a lot to
do with the financial bubble and its burst: the
low-interest policy has exaggerated the leveraging
capacity of property owners everywhere and
led certain countries to unsustainable produc-
tive specialisation. Although durables markets
will recover within reasonable time, it is clear
that it will take years to absorb the excess of
housing built in recent years and the scarce
number being made during this period. In
the short term, it will become impossible to
prevent generalised high unemployment
and declining living standard, which will be
the stronger the more wrong productive
 specialisation is.
Spanish banks in their turn are doing their
best to save their balance sheets, where
mortgages to individuals and any sort of
financing of real estate developers play a
 significant role. The most reasonable way for
a bank to act is devoting its financial capacity
to refinancing these assets in order to avoid
delinquency and thus deterioration of their
own balance sheet. Their very survival is at
stake. However, this will only delay price
adjustment and thus prolong the crisis. At
the same time, this justifies the claim of the
public for governmental action to stream
credit into productive activity.
The industrial crisis has a lot to do
with the financial bubble and its
burst: the low-interest policy has
exaggerated the leveraging
capacity of property owners
everywhere and led certain
countries to unsustainable
productive specialisation.
Also, the crisis has exacerbated protectionist
pressure against international competition all
over, especially in the United States.
From an ideological point of view, the crisis
is thus likely to do away with reluctance to
government intervention in allocating
resources among economic sectors:
 economic state control. It will take time to
forget the picture of the Big Three bosses
(the most important United States car
 makers) humbly asking Congress for fund-
ing and Barack Obama – an outstanding
politician but after all a lawyer with no
industrial experience – making statements
on strategic lines these companies have to
invest in.
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If the crisis blew up the intellectual reputation
of liberalism regarding both macroeconomic
balance and industrial management, the
question is now which consensus will domi-
nate post-crisis economic thought.
A reason for optimism is provided by our
seeming ability to learn from our mistakes
when their consequences are catastrophic:
After the 1930s it was accepted that the
neoclassical self-regulated market model
worked very well in theory and could even
be applied to the light industry but it could
not afford default of a medium-sized finan-
cial institution, no matter how irresponsibly
their managers may have acted and how
bad its balance sheet may be. After seventy
years and much talk about market omnis-
cience, this lesson seemed forgotten to the
point that Lehman Brothers was allowed
to go bankrupt. However, as soon as it
became clear that the consequence could be
a default cascade, the attitude changed and
all Western governments quickly made clear
that they would not allow any more bank-
ruptcy in finance.
While the Western world collectively
yielded to inflationary numbness during the
1960s, Germany kept inflation at bay
because it had not forgotten the catastrophic
effects of hyperinflation in the 1920s. After
depression in the seventies, Western Euro-
pean monetary policy was based on the
German model.
What lesson will we learn from this crisis?
Certainly two: interest rates cannot be kept
very low during a bullish phase even if inflation
seems under control, and public authorities
must not stop protecting financial institu-
tions from incompetence and carelessness
of their managers, even if supervisors are
necessarily civil servants.
In an ideal world we might learn more
things. Out of the mistakes made in the
1930s, in the 1960s and in the turn of the
century, a wise balance between Keynesianism
and monetarism (or social-democratic inter-
ventionism and liberalism, if you prefer polit-
ical terminology) could emerge: market and
fiscal balance in times of normality, restrictive
monetary policy when asset prices rise, control
over risk quality of financial institutions and
Keynesian intervention only in case of market
blockade – and keeping foreign markets
always open.
Public authorities must not stop
protecting financial institutions
from incompetence and
carelessness of their managers.
However, I have few doubts in human
capacity to repeat the same mistakes. Even if
every past crisis taught its lesson, it is also
true that it led to create a paradigm that
resulted fatal in the long term. It is difficult
to think that inflation will be tolerated again,
but once liberalism – or mistrust of interven-
tion – has ideologically been blown up, the
danger is now that Western governments
surrender to corporative pressure of any
kind. Such action would mean a higher public
deficit than that justified to leave the crisis
behind as well as protection of economic
areas against foreign competition. This is
unfortunately what happens when the state
takes over economy.
The author had the occasion of practising industrial
interventionism when it had not many intellectual
advocates but was quite necessary (in the late
1980s and early 1990s). However, now that scru-
ples have disappeared everywhere, I think it is
important to say that economic progress is inti-
mately linked to market freedom, interventionism
has to be exceptional in its timely and physical
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scope and protection creates slow but steady
weakness of what is supposed to be protected.
Hence I think that the intellectual economic
 community, apart from being humble, has now
the duty to keep enough calm and warn of excess
caused by the current economic intervention
wave. The market is not omniscient and particularly
the financial system needs to be controlled, but
lack of competition leads to incompetence. The
public sector needs to provide – either directly or
indirectly – a set of commodities for welfare and
for economic strength, and these commodities
need to be funded with taxes. Finally, markets need
to be open to international trade, even if emerging
countries have different regulations and practices
from ours.
The market is not omniscient and
particularly the financial system needs
to be controlled, but lack of
competition leads to incompetence.
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